

"5. It is essential that the following *primary objectives* be achieved:

"a. Denial of the area to Soviet domination.

"b. Continued availability of sufficient Near Eastern oil to meet vital Western European requirements on reasonable terms.

"6. It is desirable that the U.S. also achieve the following *secondary objectives* to the extent compatible with the two primary objectives:

"a. Peaceful resolution as early as possible, in whole or in part, of the Arab-Israeli dispute.

"b. Continued availability to the U.S. and its allies of rights of peaceful passage through and intercourse with the area in accordance with international law and custom and existing international agreements.

"c. Political evolution and economic and social development in the area to promote stable governments, popularly supported and resistant to Communist influence and subversion.

"d. Continued availability to the U.S. and its allies of important strategic positions, including military overflight, staging and base rights in the area.

"e. The expansion of U.S. and, where appropriate, Free World influence in the area, and the countering and reduction of Communist influence."

There were numerous disagreements among the members of the Planning Board as to language for NSC 5820. In paragraph 4 of NSC 5820, the representatives of the Departments of Defense and the Treasury suggested the following first two sentences:

"It has become increasingly apparent that the prevention of further Soviet penetration of the Near East and progress in solving Near Eastern problems depends on the degree to which the U.S. is able to work more closely with authentic Arab nationalism and associate itself more intimately with the legitimate aims and aspirations of the Arab people. Of significance also will be the position which the U.S. adopts regarding the foremost spokesman of radical pan-Arab nationalism, Gamal Abdel Nasser."

The majority of the Board recommended the following language:

"It has become increasingly apparent that the prevention of further Soviet penetration of the Near East and progress in solving Near Eastern problems depends on the degree to which the U.S. is able to establish a working relationship with radical pan-Arab nationalism as represented by the United Arab Republic (UAR). In the eyes of the great mass of Arabs, the test of U.S. sincerity will be whether we appear to get along with the foremost spokesman of radical pan-Arab nationalism, Gamal Abdel Nasser."